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Decentralization and the Welfare State: 
What Do Citizens Perceive?  
 
 
  
Abstract 
Trust in public institutions and public policies are generally perceived as a 
precondition for economic recovery in times of recession. Recent empirical 
evidence tends to find a positive link between decentralization and trust. But 
our knowledge about whether decentralization – through increased trust – 
improves the perception of the delivery and effectiveness of public policies 
is still limited. In this paper we estimate the impact of fiscal and political 
decentralization on the perception of the state of the education system and of 
health services, by using the 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008 waves of the 
European social survey. The analysis of the views of 160,000 individuals in 
31 European countries indicates that while the effect of fiscal 
decentralization on the perception of the state of the health and education 
system is unambiguously positive, political decentralization affects citizen’s 
satisfaction with education and health delivery in different ways. The 
influence of political decentralization, however, is highly contingent on 
whether we consider the capacity of the local or regional government to 
exercise authority over its citizens (self-rule) or to influence policy at the 
national level (shared-rule).  
 
 
Keywords: Education, health, satisfaction, fiscal and political 
decentralization, Europe. 
JEL codes: H11, H77  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The global drive towards decentralization and the greater emphasis on a supposed 
‘economic dividend’ (Morgan, 2002) linked to the transfer of powers and resources to 
subnational tiers of government has put the economic returns of local and regional 
autonomy under the microscope. In recent years a greater number of empirical analyses 
have delved into the economic implications of decentralisation processes all over the 
world. The majority of these analyses have been concerned with the link between 
decentralisation and economic growth (e.g. Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Thießen, 2003; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004; Iimi, 2005; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2011) and 
between decentralization and regional inequalities (e.g. Gil Canaleta et al., 2004; 
Ezcurra and Pascual, 2008; Lessmann, 2009; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). The 
emphasis on cross-country macroanalyses has been complemented by a spate of recent 
studies using microdata aimed at untangling the complex relationship between 
decentralization, on the one hand, and poverty (Sepúlveda and Martínez-Vázquez, 
2011), interpersonal inequality (Morelli and Seaman, 2007; Tselios et al., 2012), or 
social capital (De Mello, 2011), on the other, respectively.  
 
However, despite the increasing tendency to justify decentralization on economic 
grounds (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008), the primary aim of transferring powers 
and resources to subnational tiers of government has never really been about delivering 
greater growth, lowering within country regional inequalities, increasing social capital, 
tackling poverty, and/or reducing interpersonal inequality. While these factors may 
certainly be an indirect consequence of decentralization, the original and still the 
fundamental objective of the transfer of powers and resources to subnational tiers of 
government is to improve the delivery of public goods and services to individuals by the 
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creation of more legitimate tiers of government, closer to the people and, therefore, 
more responsive to their needs and wants. Hence, most research on the economic 
implications of decentralisation skips an important step. Rather than concentrating on 
the changes in the quality of the provision of public goods and services, they go directly 
to the economic consequences derived from the change in the scale of the delivery of 
policies. This represents a significant leap of faith as local and regional governments 
are, in principle, designing and implementing policies in response to the needs and 
wants of local citizens, which may not necessarily lead to a maximization of growth 
prospects or to a reduction of territorial disparities. Another relevant aspect of political 
and fiscal decentralization processes is their potential impact on accountability. Studies 
dealing with this issue are scarce. Using cross-country data, Fisman and Gatti (2002) 
found that decentralization in government expenditure is strongly and significantly 
associated with lower corruption. Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) observed that, in 
the case of Spain, the duration of regional autonomy positively affects the capacity of 
citizens to correctly assign responsibility. 
Ideally, given that the main aim of fiscal and political decentralization is to improve the 
provision of public services to citizens, a more suitable approach would be to evaluate 
the impact of decentralization using objective measures picking up objective outcomes. 
Unfortunately, such objective measures are rarely available. One exception is Diaz-
Serrano and Meix-Llop (2012), who use information on students’ outcomes (PISA data) 
in order to evaluate the impact of fiscal and political decentralization on school 
outcomes. In the absence of a wider range of objective measures, satisfaction with 
public institutions and services seems a suitable approach.  The absence of comparable 
objective measures makes the analysis of whether decentralization yields more or less 
satisfaction with government and public policies the most viable option. This is also a 
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topic which, despite its importance, has been virtually ignored by the scholarly 
literature. In spite of the recent boom in research on subjective well-being (SWB) and 
happiness, only a limited number of papers have concentrated on the implications of 
decentralization for happiness (e.g. Frey and Stutzer, 2000, 2002;  Bjørnskov et al., 
2008a; Voigt and Blume, 2009; Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). To the extent 
of our knowledge, there are no papers which have delved into how the implementation 
of policies and the provision of public services by subnational tiers of government affect 
the level of citizens’ satisfaction with the very policies, such as education and health, 
which are increasingly delivered at the regional or local level. In other words, we seem 
to know more about how policies and services by subnational governments impinge on 
aggregate growth and territorial disparities, on poverty and interpersonal inequality, 
than about whether having public policies designed and implemented closer to the 
people lead to greater satisfaction with public services.  
 
Economic crisis generally lead to a fall in the confidence and trust in public institutions. 
Although this is a consistent empirical finding, our understanding of the links between 
economic performance and trust is still partial, at best (Lawrence, 1997). The state of 
economy and the efficiency of public policies is a fundamental precondition for 
recovery. But lack of trust in public institutions is an important constraint for 
policymakers when considering and implementing expansionary policies aimed at 
overcoming the economic crisis. Where the link of trust between government and 
citizens has been broken, the scope for all segments of society to work together is 
limited and may jeopardise a sustainable recovery. However, generating this sort of trust 
is often difficult. Recent literature tends to find a positive link between trust and 
decentralization (Dincer 2010; Lightart and Oudheusden 2011).  
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Given the mediating effect of decentralization on the link between economic progress 
and trust, we find that in time of economic crisis decentralization may contribute to 
produce the necessary amounts of trust in public institutions needed to overcome 
economic crises. Hence, satisfaction with public institutions may be a precondition for 
trust. In this paper, we analyse whether decentralization – the granting of greater powers 
and resources to subnational tiers of government – has an impact on citizen’s 
satisfaction in public services, such as education and health, and whether these can 
become a driver of this trust in institutions and public policies. We find health and 
education crucial elements in the generation of public trust. 
 
In order to do this, we resort to micro data, consisting of more than 160,000 
observations, coming for the four available waves of the European social survey (2002, 
2004, 2006 and 2008) for 31 countries in Europe. After controlling for a series of 
personal and national characteristics which may affect individual levels of satisfaction 
with public services, the results of analysis reveal that the perception of the state of 
education and health services is affected by the degree of decentralization, but is also 
sensible to the balance between political and fiscal decentralization in any given 
country.  
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 first looks at the potential 
link between decentralization and the provision of education and health. In section 3, we 
describe the dataset and present the empirical framework. The results of the analysis, 
focusing both on the effect of individual factors and of decentralisation and country 
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level variables, are introduced in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes and discusses 
some preliminary policy implications.  
 
2. DECENTRALIZATION, EDUCATION AND HEALTH 
2.1. Assessment of education and health and its determinants 
Although there is a growing literature trying to analyse the determinants of subjective 
well-being, little has been done yet regarding the determinants of citizens’ perceptions 
of the welfare state. The few studies examining perceptions of the state of the education 
system and of the delivery of health services tend either to be cross-country descriptive 
overviews, comparing the variation of citizens’ health care system preferences across 
different countries (e.g. Blendon et al., 1990; Mossialos, 1997) or analyses focusing on 
the determinants of satisfaction with the health system, using health care outputs (e.g. 
Kotzian 2009), as well as health care inputs (e.g. Wendt et al. 2010). Other studies link 
subjective well-being (i.e. life satisfaction) with expenditures in health care and a 
number of individual characteristics (e.g. Kotakorpi and Laamanen 2010). As far as we 
are aware, the literature on the citizens’ perception of the public education system is 
non-existent.   
 
Following Frey and Stutzer (2000), we expect the individuals’ perception of the 
education and health systems to be determined by three groups of factors. The first set 
of factors is related to the demographic characteristics and personality of individuals. 
Factors such as the age, gender, marital status, health, education, religiosity and political 
orientation of an individual are likely to influence his/her perception of the state of the 
education and health system. Similarly, micro- and macroeconomic factors, such as 
income, unemployment and inflation, would have a non-negligible influence on the 
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collective perception of the delivery of public goods and services. Finally, a third set of 
factors – which can be included into an institutional and constitutional category – relate 
to our key variables of interest, and include the levels of fiscal and political 
decentralisation in given country.   
 
Among the three categories mentioned above, institutional and constitutional factors 
remain the most elusive. The main problem that scholars and policy-makers face in this 
sort of institutional analyses concerns the valuation of the effectiveness of public 
policies, in general, and of education and health, in particular.
1
 According to the 
traditional revealed preference approach, any valuation of education and health should 
be based on individual choices. However, as Frey and Stutzer (2005) underline, 
attempting to value public goods with this method can be problematic. They propose 
subjective variables in economic analysis as an alternative. Subjective variables eliciting 
information about individuals’ satisfaction in different domains are aimed at capturing 
individuals’ assessments of public policies and of the delivery of public goods. Another 
interesting feature of these indicators is that they are independent of the expected goal 
decided by experts and policy-makers when implementing public policies, as 
individuals themselves state how satisfied they are with a particular public policy or 
service delivery. Considering these arguments, we resort to the citizens’ subjective 
valuation of the education system and of health services in order to assess the welfare 
gains derived from political and fiscal decentralization. 
 
                                                 
1
Some exceptions are Barankay and Lockwood (2007) and Diaz-Serrano and Meix-Llop (2012). These 
studies analyse the impact of fiscal decentralization on school outcomes. Results report an unambiguous 
positive effect. Diaz-Serrano and Meix-Llop (2012) also test the impact of political decentralization and 
find the opposite effect. 
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Although subjective variables have proven to contain relevant information to predict 
individuals’ economic behaviour and the utility derived from economic outcomes, the 
use of these variables for the evaluation of the impact of public policies is not well 
extended. The reasons for this are twofold. First, while the collection of information on 
happiness and subjective well-being has grown exponentially over the last few years, a 
certain dearth of information remains about the degree of satisfaction of individuals 
with specific policies. Relatively few surveys have dwelt on the level of satisfaction of 
individuals with, for example, the provision of health services. Perhaps more 
importantly, the theoretical explanations about how processes such as decentralisation 
may influence the level of satisfaction with the provision of public policies remain, as 
indicated by Bjørnskov et al. (2008a), relatively underdeveloped.  
 
2.2 Welfare gains and losses of decentralization 
As, as far as we are aware, there are no prior studies on the impact of decentralization 
on citizens’ satisfaction with the provision of public services, we have to start with the 
literature linking decentralization and subjective well-being in order to develop our 
theoretical framework. This literature tends to find a positive link between the level of 
decentralization and individuals’ life satisfaction (Frey and Stutzer, 2000; Bjørnskov et 
al., 2008a; Voigt and Blume, 2009; Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose, 2012). These 
results are in accordance with the ‘fiscal decentralization theorem’ (Tiebout, 1956; 
Klugman, 1994): a better matching of public goods and services delivery to the needs of 
citizens leads, ceteris paribus, to greater satisfaction with policy and political 
institutions. Institutions, in turn, lead to improvements in individual well-being (Frey 
and Stutzer, 2012). 
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In a cross country analysis Diaz-Serrano and Rodríguez-Pose (2012) report that the 
impact of decentralization on satisfaction with government, democracy, and the 
economic situation of a country is ambiguous. More specifically, they indicate that 
fiscal decentralization, measured by the expenditure capacity of subnational 
governments, exerts a positive influence on satisfaction with political institutions. By 
contrast, if fiscal decentralization is proxied by revenue, the observed impact is 
negative. Similar results are observed when determining the impact of political 
decentralization on satisfaction with institutions. The level of authority of regional 
government over those who live in the region leaves a negative impression on the 
satisfaction with the economy, government, and democracy. However, the authority 
exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole leads 
to the opposite effect. Hence, according to this evidence, the expected positive effect of 
decentralization on subjective well-being stated by the decentralization theorem is far 
from guaranteed when, rather than focusing on the life satisfaction of individuals, their 
perceptions of institutions and policies are gauged. Therefore, the effect of 
decentralization on the citizens’ perception of the delivery of education and health 
services may vary significantly according to the type and level of decentralization.  
 
As a consequence, in order to build sound theoretical arguments about the relationship 
between decentralisation and satisfaction with public policies, we have to start by 
looking at the theoretical stances in favour and against the transfer of power and 
resources to subnational tiers of government (Bjørnskov et al., 2008a: 147). On the one 
hand, decentralisation is often viewed as a means to deliver more efficient public 
policies. In centralised governments policy-makers cater for the whole country with 
their decisions, but centralised decisions may benefit certain individuals and regions at 
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the expense of others, especially in the case of large and heterogeneous countries. 
Therefore, the chance of covering diverse needs and wants is somewhat limited by the 
requirement to deliver overall efficiency and is likely to leave a large percentage of the 
population dissatisfied with public policies and government. The shift in scale of 
decision-making, which is the essence of decentralization, implies that governments 
have a greater potential to tailor their specific policies to the needs of citizens. As 
already mentioned above, this is what is known as the ‘fiscal decentralization theorem’ 
(Tiebout, 1956; Klugman, 1994). 
 
The shift in the scale of policy delivery may also bring about other positive 
consequences. The provision of public goods and services at a local level is considered 
to pitch localities and regions against one another, generating competition and pushing 
local governments to provide more efficient policies (Hayek, 1939; Tiebout, 1956). 
Competition may lead to an improvement in the provision of public goods and services 
– and, consequently, to increased citizen satisfaction – as a consequence of the fear of 
citizens ‘voting with their feet’.  
 
Territorial competition for the provision of policies is also intrinsically linked to greater 
policy innovation (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). Competition and the need to 
provide better services often creates the conditions for policy innovation, which can 
then be relatively easily diffused to neighbouring territories (Oates, 1972; Donohue, 
1997).  
 
A final positive aspect linked to decentralisation which may enhance citizens’ 
satisfaction with public policies is the greater transparency and accountability and the 
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improvements in governance that having governments closer to the citizens may bring 
about (Putnam 1993; Azfar et al. 1999). Regional and local governments have, almost 
by definition, a greater proximity to citizens, possibly enhancing the level of individual 
satisfaction with political organizations and public policies. They also tend to be 
associated with improvements in governance, although, as highlighted by Bjørnskov et 
al. (2008b: 152), good governance may not be associated with greater levels of 
happiness and may, in some cases, be detrimental for it. 
  
However, decentralisation does not always bring about positive outcomes and may, 
under specific circumstances, unleash mechanisms that could also undermine the level 
of satisfaction of citizens with specific policies. The decentralisation theorem assumes 
that the needs and wants of citizens vary from one territory to another. However, it may 
be the case that the demands of individuals are basically the same across territories. 
Regardless where they live, individuals will demand good access to education, health 
care, or basic services (Prud’homme, 1995). The transfer of power and resources to 
subnational governments may imply that, first, not all subnational governments have got 
the same capacity to deliver those policies to high standards, and second, that 
differences in the provision of these services may lead to lower levels of satisfaction. In 
particular, in those cases where local governments suffer from lack of economies of 
scale or capacity constraints, the potential for an efficient delivery of specific public 
goods and services would be severely jeopardised. The capacity of individuals to 
compare policies across local and regional borders may be an additional source of 
dissatisfaction, especially in those cases where the perception is that the local 
government is delivering less developed and/or efficient policies in specific public 
sector realms. As a consequence, decentralisation may contribute to trigger 
12 
 
dissatisfaction with the provision of essential public services, especially in those regions 
and localities which either lack the capacity for an adequate delivery of these policies, 
or where the population perceives that the quality of the provision of public goods and 
services by the local government is lower than in neighbouring areas.   
 
Finally, the level of satisfaction with the provision of public services is likely to be 
affected by whether subnational governments have access to the right amount of funds 
to implement the policies they are supposed to implement. It is frequently the case – 
especially when subnational governments are funded by transfers rather than by direct 
taxation – that local governments have to cope with ‘unfunded mandates’, whereby 
subnational governments have the powers to implement specific policies, but lack the 
resources to do so either adequately or, at least, at the same level as the central or 
federal government (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003). This mismatch between the 
powers and resources at the disposal of local governments may lead to permanent 
dissatisfaction with the provision of education and health by subnational governments 
and, hence, distinguishing between the powers (political decentralisation) and the 
resources (fiscal decentralisation) at the disposal of subnational governments is essential 
in order to understand what drives the satisfaction with the goods and services provided 
by subnational governments. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK AND DATA 
3.1. The data 
Taking the previous theoretical discussion into account, we assess whether in more 
decentralized countries there is a better or worse assessment of the education system 
and health services by citizens by examining the link between differences in political 
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and fiscal decentralisation, on the one hand, and the perception by individuals of the 
education and health systems, on the other, across 31 European countries. 
  
The source of the indicators of satisfaction with the education and health systems is the 
European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS is a biannual cross national survey assessing 
the attitudes and values of individuals in a wide range of areas. It covers a large number 
of adults in every European country, with samples which typically range between 1,500 
and 3,000 individuals per country and year. We rely on the four survey years (2002, 
2004, 2006 and 2008) made available by the ESS at the time of writing. Unfortunately 
not all countries included in the analysis are sampled in every wave of the survey. 
Hence, in order to maximize the number of observations by country and introduce also a 
temporal dimension to the data, we pool the four available waves of the ESS.  Table 1 
depicts the sample, including the number of individuals sampled per country in each 
specific wave. 
 
Table 1 [around here] 
 
One of the most important features of the ESS questionnaire is that it contains both 
fixed and rotating elements. In the rotating part of the questionnaire, every wave 
includes two specific topics that change from wave to wave. The fixed part consists of 
questions that are included in every ESS-wave. This module contains general 
demographic and socioeconomic information on each individual sampled, as well as 
information concerning his/her level of satisfaction with different aspects of government 
and policy. We resort to these variables as a means to assess the relationship between 
decentralisation and the level of satisfaction with the education and health systems. The 
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perception of the provision of education and health by individuals is measured on an 
eleven-point Likert scale, with 0 being the lowest level of satisfaction and 10 the 
highest. In Table 2 we show the summary statistics of these two variables.  
 
Table 2 [around here] 
 
Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, and Belgium are the countries where citizens 
exhibit a better opinion of the education system, with scores of 6.47 or above. At the 
bottom of the ranking, we find Germany, Israel, Ukraine, Portugal, and Bulgaria, with 
scores below 4.5. With respect to health services, the top five scores correspond to 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, Austria, and Iceland. Poland, Hungary, Russia, 
Bulgaria, and the Ukraine are at the opposite end of the spectrum.  
 
Our key explanatory variables consist of a set of decentralization indicators. Hooghe et 
al.’s (2008) Regional Authority Index (RAI) is used as our political decentralization 
index. Two main variables and seven subcomponents make up the RAI.  The two key 
variables of the RAI are what Hooghe et al. (2008) define as self-rule and shared-rule. 
The former depicts the authority exercised by local and regional governments over those 
who live in the region. The latter measures their influence on national politics and 
policy as a whole. These two variables are built by aggregating a set of more specific 
decentralization indicators in some governance domains. Self-rule is constructed as the 
combination of the following four indexes: i) the extent to which a regional government 
is autonomous rather than deconcentrated (institutional depth); ii) the range of policies 
for which a regional government is responsible; iii) the extent to which a regional 
government can independently tax its population, and iv) the extent to which a region is 
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endowed with an independent legislature and executive. Shared-rule comprises the 
following three indexes: i) the extent to which a regional government co-determines 
national policy in intergovernmental meetings (executive control); ii) the extent to 
which regional representatives co-determine the distribution of national tax revenues, 
and; iii) the extent to which regional representatives co-determine constitutional change 
(constitutional reform). In our econometric analysis, we use both the aggregated and the 
disaggregated indicators of decentralization. The RAI covers a total of 42 countries for 
the period between 1950 and 2006. 
 
Our fiscal decentralisation data stem from the International Monetary Fund's 
Government Finance Statistics. These are consolidated expenditure yearly indicators 
consisting of the ratio between subnational and national magnitudes for the period 
1972-2005. In our analysis we resort to five indicators of fiscal decentralization: total 
expenditure, current expenditure, capital expenditure, total revenues, and tax revenues. 
The specific decentralization variables are defined in greater detail in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 [around here] 
 
According to the self-rule index, the top five politically decentralized countries are 
Germany, Spain, Switzerland, Belgium, and Italy. At the bottom of the ranking we find 
relatively small countries, such as Iceland, Luxembourg, Estonia, Cyprus, and Slovenia. 
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Russia, and Austria are the countries with a greater 
degree of shared-rule. The top five fiscally decentralized countries include Switzerland, 
Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Spain. Israel, Luxembourg, Portugal, Iceland and 
Bulgaria are at the bottom of this ranking. The fiscal decentralization index reported in 
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Table 4 is the average of the five fiscal decentralization indexes used in the analysis (see 
Table 1). 
 
Table 4 [around here] 
 
In order to test the impact of decentralization on an individual’s perception of the 
delivery of public services, we match the ESS with the decentralization variables. All 
individuals surveyed in the ESS and residing in the same country are assigned the same 
value of the corresponding decentralization index. Since the individual data used here 
pool the four waves of the ESS, the decentralization variables vary not only by country, 
but also by wave. For any country, we assign the time-average of the last four years 
prior to the survey of a given decentralization measure. For the 2008 wave, we resort to 
the decentralization indicators in 2006. We proceed in this way because the latest 
available years for our decentralization measures are 2005 and 2006 for the fiscal 
decentralization and the RAI dataset, respectively. In Table 4, we rank the countries 
included in our sample according to their level of decentralization.  
 
3.2. Empirical framework 
In order to establish whether the aspects linked to decentralization lead to a better or 
worse assessment of the education system and health services by citizens, our analysis 
examines how cross-country differences in political and fiscal decentralization (key 
independent variables) affect the level of satisfaction of individuals with the education 
and health systems (dependent variables). Our outcome variables are the individuals’ 
subjective assessment of the health and education system. This implies that the effect of 
the country level covariates on the outcome is more sensible to vary, in some cases in a 
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non-negligible way, in different periods of time. In order to take this temporal 
dimension into account, we pool the four available waves of the ESS. This allows us to 
capture potential economic or institutional shocks in a country in a given period of time 
that may result in changes in the self-perception of health and education.  
 
The satisfaction equation adopts the following form: 
 
* ' '
ict ict ct cr t ictS X Z u d        (1) 
 
where *
ictS  is a latent outcome reflecting the propensity of individual i in period t 
residing in country c to report a specific self-perceived assessment of the state of the 
education or health services. Xict depicts some basic characteristics of the individual, Zct 
are the country-specific variables, ucr are country-region specific effects, and dt are time 
controls. ict represents the random error term.  and  are the parameters to be 
estimated. Country-region specific effects are preferred to simple country specific 
effects in order to calculate the coefficient of not only of the specific-country variables 
Zct, but also to take into account unobservable country factors. The use country-region 
specific effects also permits to control for intra-country variation.  
 
In equation (1), we do not observe *
iS  but instead an indicator variable of the type Sict=j 
if 
*
1j ict jS     (j=1, …, J). Given the ordinal nature of the outcome variable, one 
option to estimate model (1) is a pooled ordinal probit model. An alternative is the use 
of a fixed-effect model, which has the advantage of taking into account country-region 
specific effects (ucr) One important shortcoming, however, is that fixed-effects models 
are not feasible in an ordinal framework. This can be addressed by moving to a linear 
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framework.
2
 The use of an 11-point Likert scale for the outcome variables implies the 
estimation of ten marginal effects per variable. Moving to a linear framework also 
facilitates the interpretation of the estimated effects, as it provides only one marginal 
effect per variable. Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2006) suggest the use of probit 
ordinary least squares (POLS).
3
 This approach enables using simple linear OLS, instead 
of ordinal probit methods, without any loss of efficiency.  
 
In addition to the country decentralization measures, we also consider a set of country-
specific variables (Zct) reflecting the economic and political environment, i.e. GDP per 
capita, inflation rate, aggregated unemployment rate, and total government spending as 
a percentage of the GDP. Government spending is considered as a proxy of public 
sector size. We also consider specific covariates in each equation. For the assessment of 
education, we include public spending in education as percentage of GDP. For health 
services, we consider public spending in health care, as well as the private spending as a 
percentage of GDP. Using country variables, in conjunction with country-region 
specific effects permits a more adequate estimation of the effect of the decentralization 
variables. In order to avoid multicollinearity, the decentralization variables enter 
equation (1) separately one by one, i.e. for each decentralization variable we estimate a 
separate equation. In equation (1), the covariates regarding individual characteristics 
Xict, are: a squared polynomial of age, gender, education, citizenship, self-reported 
health status, religiosity, left-right political orientation, marital status, feeling about 
household income, employment situation and household size.  
 
                                                 
2
 We use the ‘within’ estimator, which subtracts group averages from the dependent variable and 
explanatory variables. 
3
 This framework involves the transformation of the observed ordinal outcome Sict=j as 
1, , , 1,ln( ) ( ) ( ) / ( ) ( )          ict j t j t j t j tZ       , where () and () are the normal density function 
and the cumulative normal distribution, respectively.  
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In order to estimate equation (1), we resort to multilevel modelling. This methodology 
is suitable when we combine both individual-level determinants and contextual 
determinants, such as at a region or country level. Multilevel models allow to measure 
country-level or regional-level variation in relation to individual-level variation, while 
controlling for country-level or regional-level influences. We utilise the simplest form 
of multilevel models, which only consider a random constant term for each country-
region.   
 
The individual level variables considered in equation (1) are described in Table 5 and 
summarized by country in Table 6.    
 
Table 5 [around here] 
Table 6 [around here] 
  
 
4. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 
4.1. The effect of individual factors 
Table 7 displays the results of estimating model (1) for the assessment of the education 
system and of public health services. The top half of Table 7 reports the coefficients for 
the individual variables likely to affect satisfaction with these services. These results 
tend to reproduce those of previous empirical studies analysing the determinants of 
subjective well-being, underlining the robustness of the exercise.  
 
Age matters for satisfaction with education and health services, but the relationship is 
U-shaped, as satisfaction increases after middle-age. Women tend to be less satisfied 
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than men with the health system. Higher levels of education yield more critical citizens 
with the delivery of public services. Health is also an important determinant of 
satisfaction with public policies. The lower the level of self-reported health, the lower 
the satisfaction with the education and the health system. Larger households tend to be 
more satisfied with health services, while the effect of household size on the assessment 
of the education system is not statistically significant. Right-leaning and more religious 
individuals are also more satisfied with the state of public services than left-leaning 
ones. Foreigners are less satisfied with public services than natives. And, as could be 
expected, those who report that they live comfortably are more satisfied than those who 
consider that they are in a very difficult or difficult position or simply coping. Finally, 
trusting individuals also reveal themselves as less critical with public services.    
 
4.2. The effect of decentralization and country level variables 
Having controlled that our results conform to previous analyses of the personality and 
socio-demographic traits behind satisfaction with public services, in the bottom half of 
Table 7 we now turn to how macroeconomic factors and political and fiscal 
decentralization outcomes affect these factors. We first comment on the results of the 
country-level macroeconomic indicators. Our estimations indicate that government 
expenditure has a statistically significant effect on both the citizens’ assessment of the 
education and health services. This effect is positive. The overall national 
unemployment rate has a positive and statistically significant impact on the satisfaction 
of individuals with the education system, while the effect is negative in their assessment 
of the health system. This result is interesting, since it indicates that in Europe the 
unemployed may blame their educational system, whereas they appreciate the 
possibility of having access to a public health system. National GDP per capita is 
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significant in both equations, i.e. satisfaction with the health system (positive). By 
contrast, inflation only exerts a significant impact (negative) on the assessment of the 
health system. Expenditure variables also turn out to be statistically significant. Public 
spending in education and in health exerts a positive influence in their respective 
equations, whereas in those countries where the private expenditure in health is higher 
the assessment of the state of health services is more damning. 
 
Table 7 [around here] 
 
For fiscal and political decentralization, our results stress that decentralization matters 
for the assessment of the delivery of public services. However, the results are 
heterogeneous across the board, depending on whether we consider fiscal or political 
decentralization. Regarding fiscal decentralization, with the exception of capital 
expenditure, all the fiscal decentralization variables have a positive and significant 
impact on the assessment of both state of the education system and the state of health 
services.  
 
The use of political decentralization indicators also delivers interesting results. The 
impact effect is positive or negative depending on whether we consider the capacity of 
subnational governments to rule their own citizens (self-rule), or their capacity to 
influence national politics and policy (shared-rule), respectively. Shared —rule has a 
negative influence on the individuals’ assessment of the education and health systems, 
although the effect seems to be weaker for the latter. This result implies that local 
citizens tend to be less satisfied with specific policies – in this case health and education 
– when local or regional governments have a greater say and/or influence on national 
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politics. This result stands when shared-rule is disaggregated into its components. 
Executive control, fiscal control, and constitutional reform are all strongly and 
negatively associated with satisfaction with the provision of education and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, with the health system. Only fiscal control is not statistically 
significant in the assessment of the health services. This means that the greater the 
capacity of autonomous governments to affect and/or shape national politics and policy, 
the smaller the satisfaction of local citizens with the delivery of education and health 
systems. The current capacity of regional or local governments to rule their own citizens 
(shared-rule) also tends to have a significant negative impact on the assessment of the 
educational system. By contrast, one of the components of the self-rule indicator, fiscal 
autonomy, has turned out to be statistically significant and positive on the assessment of 
the health services equation.  
 
All these results taken together seem to suggest that citizens, when it comes to the 
concrete delivery of services, seem to prefer that their local governments have the fiscal, 
rather than the political, capacity to deliver them. Power without adequate resources is 
perceived as a suboptimal outcome for the provision of services. They also prefer that 
their governments provide these services directly to them rather than they wield a 
greater influence on the provision of health and education services at a national level. 
However, they do not seem very satisfied with the idea that other regions may influence 
public policies regarding education and health that may have an impact on their 
wellbeing. Analogously, greater political autonomy for local governments in the design 
of public policies causes a more negative assessment of the educational system. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
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This paper goes beyond the traditional economic growth and territorial disparity 
analyses which have been at the heart of most studies of fiscal – and to a lesser extent 
political – decentralization until recently. It has ventured into the black box of how 
institutions affect the assessment of the provision of basic public services linked to the 
welfare state by individuals. The paper also uses a dynamic approach in order to limit 
the role of any potential shocks that may affect the individuals’ perception of the state 
of health and education services. One of our key tenets is that changes in the degree of 
satisfaction with public policies and services ultimately affect the perception of 
institutions.   
 
The results of the analysis underscore the crucial role that both political and fiscal 
decentralization have on the perception of the state of education and health services. 
This in contrast with the majority of traditional analyses which have tended to cast aside 
decentralization as a minor player – if at all – for productivity, economic growth, or 
government effectiveness (e.g. Voigt and Blume, 2009; Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 
2011; Feld and Schnellenbach, 2011). The results also point to the need to focus more 
on the key objective of the decentralization of power and resources: that of delivering 
policies better tailored to the needs and wants of the individuals living in any given 
territory, rather than on macroeconomic outcomes.  
 
In this respect, our results reveal that decentralization makes a difference for the 
perception of the delivery of public services. Regardless of whether we consider the 
education system or the health service, or whether we look at fiscal or political 
decentralization, the degree of decentralization of any given country influences the 
satisfaction of individuals with the provision of these essential services. From a political 
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decentralization perspective, citizens are generally less satisfied with decisions on 
education taken by governments closer to them (self-rule), as indicated by the lower 
levels of satisfaction with the capacity to effectively provide concrete policies in the 
areas of education. Similarly, individuals also value negatively the capacity of local 
governments to influence national politics and the national provision of health and 
education (shared-rule). Fiscal decentralization also has a significant and positive effect 
on satisfaction with public services, even though factors such as the level of subnational 
capital expenditure do not influence the level of satisfaction with both education and 
health. These results are in line with those obtained in Diaz-Serrano and Meix-Llop 
(2012).  
These results highlight that the impact of decentralisation on the perception of public 
services is not unambiguous. By and large, and with some caveats, decentralized parts 
of Europe tend to have a greater trust in institutions such as democracy, government and 
the state of economy (Diaz-Serrano and Rodriguez-Pose, 2012). However its impact on 
basic pillars of the welfare state as the public provision of education and health is not 
unequivocal, especially when political decentralization is taken in to account. This 
situation is particularly evident in countries where a higher level of political 
decentralization is not endowed with an equivalent higher level of fiscal 
decentralization, i.e. in conditions of unfunded mandates, when subnational 
governments are endowed with the capacity to decide but not with the capacity to 
deliver. Still the results indicate that decentralization may contribute to the generation of 
the necessary trust at the root of the consensus and support for policies needed in times 
of crisis. Whether this trust and support materialises into a sustainable recovery will, 
however, very much depend on how efficient regional local governments are at 
delivering their policies. That is, subnational governments should have a more equitable 
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mix of political and fiscal decentralization. We think our results represent a first step in 
what should be a wider approach to a better understanding of the implications of 
different forms and levels of government on the perception of the delivery of basic 
public welfare services.  
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Table 1. Number of observations by country and wave 
 2002 2004 2006 2008 
Austria 2,257 2,256   
Belgium 1,899 1,778 1,798 1,760 
Bulgaria   1,400 2,230 
Switzerland 2,040 2,141 1,804 1,819 
Cyprus   995 1,215 
Czech Republic 1,360 3,026   
Germany 2,919 2,870 2,916 2,751 
Denmark 1,506 1,487 1,505 1,610 
Estonia  1,989 1,517 1,661 
Spain 1,729 1,663 1,876 2,576 
Finland 2,000 2,022 1,896 2,195 
France 1,503 1,806 1,986 2,073 
United 
Kingdom 2,052 1,897 2,394 2,352 
Greece 2,566 2,406   
Hungary 1,685 1,498 1,518 1,544 
Ireland 2,046 2,286   
Israel 2,499   2,490 
Iceland  579   
Italy 1,207    
Luxembourg 1,552 1,635   
Netherlands 2,364 1,881  1,778 
Norway 2,036 1,760 1,750 1,549 
Poland 2,110 1,716 1,721 1,619 
Portugal 1,511 2,052 2,222 2,367 
Russia   2,437 2,512 
Sweden 1,999 1,948 1,927 1,830 
Slovenia 1,519 1,442 1,476 1,286 
Slovakia  1,512 1,766 1,810 
Turkey  1,856   
Ukraine  2,031   
Source: Own elaboration based on the European Social Survey 
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Table 2. Summary statistics of the satisfaction variables, values are estimated from 
individual responses and averaged by country.  
  Education system   Health services 
  mean s.d.    mean s.d.  
Finland  7.85 1.41   Belgium 7.23 1.72  
Denmark  7.42 1.79   Luxembourg 7.07 2.3  
Iceland  6.85 1.9   Finland 6.77 1.94  
Ireland  6.68 2.3   Austria 6.61 2.29  
Belgium  6.47 2.08   Iceland 6.57 2.1  
Norway  6.31 1.82   Switzerland 6.47 2.15  
Switzerland  6.27 2.03   Israel 6.22 2.43  
Czech Republic  6.15 2.09   Denmark 6.18 2.11  
Austria  5.96 2.37   Cyprus 5.96 2.22  
Cyprus  5.96 2.09   France 5.93 2.22  
Netherlands  5.74 1.76   Spain 5.84 2.16  
Estonia  5.6 2.19   Norway 5.75 2.08  
Sweden  5.53 2.09   Netherlands 5.74 1.95  
United Kingdom  5.51 2.14   Turkey 5.63 3.3  
Slovakia  5.47 2.28   Sweden 5.55 2.23  
Luxembourg  5.37 2.5   United Kingdom 5.41 2.37  
Slovenia  5.33 2.28   Czech Republic 5.2 2.38  
Poland  5.2 2.28   Slovenia 4.91 2.44  
Spain  5.16 2.08   Italy 4.67 2.19  
Turkey  5.16 3.31   Germany 4.63 2.38  
Italy  5.01 2   Estonia 4.5 2.32  
France  4.99 2.12   Slovakia 4.4 2.58  
Greece  4.77 2.41   Greece 4.36 2.64  
Hungary  4.71 2.36   Ireland 4.04 2.64  
Russia  4.38 2.4   Portugal 3.72 2.18  
Germany  4.37 2.2   Poland 3.65 2.43  
Israel  4.35 2.62   Hungary 3.56 2.4  
Ukraine  4.02 2.25   Russia 3.43 2.34  
Portugal  3.95 1.98   Bulgaria 2.92 2.37  
Bulgaria  3.71 2.44   Ukraine 2.68 2.07  
 Source: European Social Survey 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. The column labelled as rank provides the 
position occupied by a country in the ranking according to the mean value of the specific satisfaction 
domain. 
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      Table 3. Description of the decentralization variables 
Self-Rule (SR) 
=ID+PS+FA+RP 
 
The authority exercised by a regional 
government over those who live in 
the region 
 
 
Institutional depth (ID) 
Extent to which a regional 
government is autonomous rather 
than deconcentrated. 
 
0: no functioning general-purpose administration at the regional level  
1: deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration  
2: non-deconcentrated, general–purpose, administration subject to central government veto  
3: non-deconcentrated, general–purpose, administration not subject to central government veto 
Policy Scope (PS) 
Range of policies for which a 
regional government is responsible 
 
0: no authoritative competencies over economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy  
1: authoritative competencies in one area: economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare state policy  
 2: authoritative competencies in at least two areas: economic policy, cultural-educational policy, welfare 
state policy  
3: authoritative competencies in at least two areas above, and in at least two of the following: residual 
powers, police, authority over own institutional set-up, local government  
4: regional government meets the criteria for 3, and has authority over immigration or citizenship 
 
Fiscal Autonomy (FA) 
Extent to which a regional 
government can independently tax 
its population 
0: the central government sets base and rate of all regional taxes  
1: the regional government sets the rate of minor taxes  
2: the regional government sets base and rate of minor taxes  
3: the regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value added or 
sales tax  
4: the regional government sets base and rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate, value 
added or sales tax 
 
Representation (RP)  
Extent to which a region is 
endowed with an independent 
legislature and executive:  
 
0: no regional assembly  
1: an indirectly elected regional assembly  
2: a directly elected assembly  
3: the regional executive is appointed by central government  
4: dual executives appointed by central government and the regional assembly  
5: the regional executive is appointed by a regional assembly or directly elected 
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Table 3 (continuation) 
Shared-Rule (SHR) 
=LM+EC+FC+CR 
 
The authority exercised by a regional 
government or its representatives in 
the country as a whole.  
 
Executive Control (EC) 
Extent to which a regional government 
co-determines national policy in 
intergovernmental meetings  
 
0: no routine meetings between central and regional governments to negotiate policy  
1: routine meetings between central and regional governments without legally binding authority  
2: routine meetings between central and regional governments with authority to reach legally binding 
decisions  
Fiscal Control (FC) 
Extent to which regional 
representatives co-determine the 
distribution of national tax revenues 
0: regional governments or their representatives in the legislature are not consulted over the distribution of 
tax revenues  
1: regional governments or their representatives in the legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax 
revenues, but do not have a veto  
2: regional governments or their representatives in the legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax 
revenues  
 
Constitutional Reform (CR) 
Extent to which regional 
representatives co-determine 
constitutional change:  
0: the central government and/or national electorate can unilaterally change the constitution  
1: a legislature based on the principle of regional representation must approve constitutional change; or 
constitutional change requires a referendum based on the principle of equal  
regional representation  
2: regional governments are a directly represented majority in a legislature which can do one or more of the 
following: postpone constitutional reform, introduce amendments, raise the decision hurdle in the other 
chamber, require a second vote in the other chamber, require a popular referendum  
3: a majority of regional governments can veto constitutional change  
 
Fiscal decentralization  Subnational Government 
Expenditure (SNGE) 
 
Indicator: Subcentral Expenditure/General Expenditure 
Definition Total Expenditure: (State Government + Local Government)/(Central Government-Social  
                                              Security + State Government + Local Government) 
 Subnational Current Expenditure 
(SNCE) 
 
 
Indicator: Subcentral Current Expenditure/General Current Expenditure 
Definition Current Expenditure: (State Government + Local Government)/(Central Government- 
                                                   Social Security + State Government + Local Government) 
 
 Subnational Capital Expenditure 
(SNCAE) 
 
 
Indicator: Subcentral Capital Expenditure/General Capital Expenditure 
Definition Capital Expenditure: (State Government + Local Government)/(Central Government-Social  
                                                    Security + State Government + Local Government) 
 
 Subnational Revenue (SNR) 
 
 
 
Indicator: Subcentral Revenue & Grants/General Revenue & Grants 
Definition Revenue & Grants: (State Government + Local Government)/(Central Government - Social 
Security + State Government + Local Government) 
 
 Subnational Tax Revenue (SNTR)  
 
 
Indicator: Subcentral Tax Revenue/General Tax Revenue 
Definition Tax Revenue: (State Government + Local Government)/(Central Government - Social Security + 
State Government + Local Government)] 
Source: Own elaboration based on IMF and RAI definitions. 
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Table 4. Time averaged decentralization indexes by country  
 Fiscal decentralization (Subnational Expenditures and Revenues)  Political decentralization 
 Total Exp.  Current Exp.  Capital Exp.  Total Rev.  Tax Rev.  Self-rule  Shared-rule 
 Score Rank  Score Rank  Score Rank  Score Rank  Score Rank  Score Rank  Score Rank 
Austria 30.49 8  51.47 12  59.69 10  32.29 7  27.93 7  12.00 8  6.00 5 
Belgium 32.22 7  73.46 3  86.54 1  32.55 6  12.94 14  23.70 1  7.84 2 
Bulgaria 13.90 18  30.48 17   20  13.53 18  6.94 18  1.31 23  0.00 13 
Cyprus                             0.00 24  0.00 13 
Czech Republic                           5.91 20  0.00 13 
Denmark 48.17 2  69.28 6  60.14 8  47.07 2  35.56 5  11.41 9  0.13 11 
Estonia                             0.00 24  0.00 13 
Finland 33.99 6  67.69 7  55.76 12  31.74 8  29.31 6  8.03 17  0.03 12 
France 17.35 17  27.95 18  63.81 5  19.35 17  16.30 12  18.25 5  0.00 13 
Germany 39.52 4  74.05 2  78.75 2  39.55 4  50.43 2  22.81 2  10.08 1 
Greece                             10.00 14  0.00 13 
Hungary 21.69 16  50.93 13  52.71 15  24.48 14  16.10 13  11.17 11  0.00 13 
Iceland 26.02 13  33.74 16  30.79 18  27.24 11  26.84 8  0.00 24  0.00 13 
Ireland 26.77 11  56.53 11  64.85 3  28.81 9  2.29 21  6.00 19  0.00 13 
Israel 11.51 20  14.49 21  54.22 13  12.63 21  7.93 17                      
Italy 24.86 14  49.76 14  59.98 9  26.65 12  19.64 9  18.89 4  1.45 8 
Luxemburg 11.54 19  26.83 19  43.96 17  12.64 20  8.04 16  0.00 24  0.00 13 
Netherlands 28.21 10  63.01 8  64.64 4  28.41 10  6.04 19  9.18 15  7.46 4 
Norway 29.55 9  56.60 10  53.22 14  23.39 16  18.22 10  11.09 12  0.00 13 
Poland 26.29 12  58.25 9  27.21 19  25.90 13  16.40 11  8.46 16  0.00 13 
Portugal 11.34 21  17.06 20  62.65 7  13.45 19  9.06 15  3.92 22  0.19 10 
Russia                             13.78 7  7.52 3 
Slovakia                             6.32 18  0.00 13 
Slovenia                             0.00 24  0.00 13 
Spain 39.29 5  72.67 4  63.33 6  40.06 3  39.18 4  22.27 3  3.51 7 
Sweden 40.25 3  70.10 5  57.78 11  39.12 5  43.69 3  11.19 10  0.00 13 
Switzerland 53.02 1  78.55 1     54.76 1  54.82 1  16.75 6  5.02 6 
Turkey                             5.00 21  0.00 13 
United Kingdom 22.98 15  42.06 15  45.17 16  24.42 15  5.42 20  10.06 13  0.53 9 
Source: Own elaboration based on IMF and RAI data. 
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Table 5. Description of individual self-perceived indicators used as covariates in equation (1) 
Variable Description 
 
 
Citizenship  
 
Are you a citizen of [country]?  
1. Yes / 2. No 
 
Self-reported health How is your health in general? Would you say it is ... 
1. Very good / 2. Good / 3. Fair / 4. Bad / 5. Very bad 
 
Religiosity How religious are you.  
0 Not at all religious / 1 / 2 / … / 10 Very religious 
 
left-right political position In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 
means the left and 10 means the right?   
0. Left / 1 /2 / … / 10 Right 
 
Feeling about income Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays?  
1. Living comfortably on present income / 2. Coping on present income / 3. Finding it difficult on present income / 4. Finding 
it very difficult on present income 
 
Trust  
 
Individual average of the three following questions: 
 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? 
0. You can't be too careful / 1 / 2 / … / 10 Most people can be trusted 
 
Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?  
0. Most people would try to take advantage of me / 1 / 2 / … / 10. Most people would try to be fair 
 
Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves? 
0. People mostly look out for themselves / 1 /2 / … / 10. People mostly try to be helpful 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the European Social Survey 
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Table 6. Time-average (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008) by country of the covariates in equation (1) 
 Age 
Self-
reported 
Health Religiosity 
Left-right 
political Trust 
Feeling 
about 
income 
Household 
size Married 
Never 
married 
Primary 
and lower 
education 
Post-
secondary 
and tertiary 
education Citizen 
 
 
Unem-
ployed Women 
Austria 45.12 1.96 5.10 4.61 5.32 1.86 2.75 0.49 0.33 0.27 0.13 0.96 0.04 0.46 
Belgium 45.63 2.04 4.86 4.89 5.07 1.86 2.92 0.56 0.27 0.16 0.35 0.95 0.07 0.49 
Bulgaria 51.12 2.48 4.28 4.67 3.64 3.08 2.86 0.61 0.17 0.09 0.21 1.00 0.11 0.42 
Switzerland 48.48 1.89 5.31 4.96 5.85 1.65 2.36 0.52 0.27 0.05 0.28 0.87 0.03 0.46 
Cyprus 45.60 1.82 6.79 5.14 4.48 2.10 3.05 0.65 0.23 0.19 0.32 0.97 0.03 0.49 
Czech Republic 49.36 2.44 2.87 5.40 4.44 2.44 2.52 0.53 0.18 0.01 0.11 0.99 0.05 0.47 
Germany 47.77 2.35 3.91 4.51 5.14 1.94 2.55 0.55 0.27 0.02 0.33 0.96 0.08 0.50 
Denmark 48.07 1.90 4.27 5.43 6.78 1.41 2.56 0.57 0.28 0.02 0.38 0.98 0.04 0.49 
Estonia 47.48 2.61 3.59 5.24 5.21 2.37 2.79 0.44 0.32 0.06 0.35 0.81 0.05 0.42 
Spain 46.63 2.30 4.50 4.48 4.87 1.93 3.06 0.58 0.29 0.37 0.19 0.94 0.06 0.48 
Finland 47.32 2.19 5.35 5.70 6.36 1.93 2.51 0.50 0.32 0.19 0.29 0.99 0.05 0.48 
France 48.30 2.27 3.72 4.78 4.90 1.87 2.55 0.51 0.29 0.22 0.40 0.97 0.06 0.46 
United Kingdom 48.82 2.08 4.22 5.06 5.49 1.81 2.38 0.48 0.26 0.01 0.39 0.97 0.05 0.46 
Greece 49.84 1.96 7.50 5.67 3.53 2.57 2.75 0.62 0.22 0.40 0.16 0.95 0.05 0.44 
Hungary 47.86 2.65 4.36 5.22 4.33 2.53 2.98 0.53 0.23 0.32 0.15 1.00 0.06 0.45 
Ireland 46.90 1.78 5.91 5.34 5.96 1.73 3.36 0.56 0.32 0.23 0.30 0.97 0.04 0.45 
Israel 43.60 2.02 4.77 5.69 5.00 2.29 3.75 0.59 0.24 0.12 0.43 0.99 0.09 0.46 
Iceland 44.50 1.83 6.06 5.09 6.50 1.56 3.16 0.51 0.35 0.07 0.57 1.00 0.02 0.48 
Italy 46.93 2.27 6.08 4.79 4.41 1.85 3.14 0.60 0.29 0.23 0.09 1.00 0.08 0.45 
Luxembourg 43.38 2.16 4.29 5.08 5.14 1.60 3.16 0.55 0.32 0.31 0.20 0.69 0.02 0.50 
Netherlands 48.86 2.17 5.02 5.21 5.79 1.65 2.49 0.54 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.98 0.03 0.44 
Norway 45.68 1.98 3.93 5.24 6.55 1.55 2.67 0.52 0.32 0.01 0.41 0.96 0.03 0.52 
Poland 43.32 2.43 6.49 5.49 3.97 2.36 3.59 0.57 0.29 0.22 0.18 1.00 0.10 0.48 
Portugal 50.59 2.62 5.69 4.91 4.22 2.47 2.64 0.57 0.22 0.59 0.11 0.97 0.06 0.40 
Russia 46.64 2.86 4.35 5.28 4.22 2.82 2.51 0.46 0.22 0.08 0.55 1.00 0.04 0.40 
Sweden 46.92 1.99 3.56 5.11 6.27 1.54 2.58 0.45 0.38 0.21 0.32 0.97 0.04 0.50 
Slovenia 45.67 2.44 4.78 4.78 4.47 1.76 3.42 0.57 0.28 0.29 0.18 1.00 0.07 0.46 
Slovakia 45.51 2.40 5.93 4.87 4.22 2.46 3.32 0.57 0.24 0.02 0.15 1.00 0.08 0.45 
Turkey 39.19 2.34 7.06 6.32 3.39 2.46 4.11 0.66 0.24 0.62 0.07 1.00 0.10 0.45 
Ukraine 49.86 3.04 5.00 5.55 4.28 3.09 2.72 0.53 0.16 0.13 0.54 0.99 0.07 0.37 
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Table 7. Linear fixed-effects estimates of equation (1). Fixed-effects and clustered standard 
errors are at region level. 
 
 
State of the 
education system 
 
State of the 
health services 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 
Coefficient t-value 
Constant 
3.056*** (0.172) 
 
2.790*** (0.211) 
Age -0.0270*** (0.00222) 
 
-0.0387*** (0.00222) 
Age squared 0.000226*** (2.21e-05) 
 
0.000419*** (2.19e-05) 
Woman -0.0740*** (0.0119) 
 
-0.285*** (0.0120) 
Primary (base: lower primary) -0.0843** (0.0379) 
 
-0.127*** (0.0379) 
Lower secondary -0.262*** (0.0378) 
 
-0.242*** (0.0379) 
Upper Secondary -0.312*** (0.0378) 
 
-0.332*** (0.0379) 
Post-secondary, non-tertiary -0.418*** (0.0429) 
 
-0.362*** (0.0432) 
First stage of tertiary -0.468*** (0.0390) 
 
-0.286*** (0.0392) 
Second stage of tertiary -0.458*** (0.0481) 
 
-0.233*** (0.0489) 
Citizenship 0.446*** (0.0346) 
 
0.549*** (0.0321) 
Self-reported health -0.107*** (0.00748) 
 
-0.155*** (0.00746) 
Religiosity 0.0361*** (0.00213) 
 
0.0358*** (0.00214) 
Left-right political scale  0.0129*** (0.00269) 
 
0.0250*** (0.00271) 
Trust 0.189*** (0.00335) 
 
0.220*** (0.00334) 
Separated (Base: married) -0.0922** (0.0468) 
 
-0.0420 (0.0473) 
Divorced -0.0695*** (0.0220) 
 
0.0380* (0.0221) 
Widowed -0.0147 (0.0243) 
 
0.0400* (0.0238) 
Never married -0.0671*** (0.0180) 
 
0.0340* (0.0181) 
Coping (Base: No problem) -0.0578*** (0.0138) 
 
-0.182*** (0.0138) 
Difficult -0.209*** (0.0194) 
 
-0.357*** (0.0195) 
Very difficult -0.391*** (0.0301) 
 
-0.623*** (0.0302) 
Unemployed (Base: retired) -0.0500* (0.0282) 
 
0.00157 (0.0281) 
In paid work -0.0457*** (0.0164) 
 
-0.140*** (0.0164) 
Student -0.153*** (0.0246) 
 
-0.0363 (0.0249) 
Disabled -0.000123 (0.0344) 
 
0.00441 (0.0343) 
Military service 0.159* (0.0949) 
 
-0.0745 (0.0977) 
Homework 0.00971 (0.0152) 
 
-0.0333** (0.0151) 
Household size 0.00186 (0.00472) 
 
0.0398*** (0.00478) 
Significant at 
*** 
1 percent, 
** 
5 percent and 
*
 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
Table 7 (continuation) 
 
 
State of the 
education system 
 
State of the 
health services 
 
Coefficient t-value 
 
Coefficient t-value 
National Indicators         
 
Government size 0.0214*** (0.00390) 
 
0.0108*** (0.00375) 
Unemployment rate -0.0198*** (0.00417) 
 
0.0279*** (0.00437) 
Inflation rate 0.0124* (0.00711) 
 
-0.0339*** (0.00737) 
GDP per capita 0.0145*** (0.00227) 
 
0.0121*** (0.00229) 
Public exp. education (% GDP) 0.114*** (0.0275)    
Public exp. health (% GDP)    0.0690*** (0.0164) 
Private exp. health (% GDP)    -0.105*** (0.0289) 
Fiscal decentralization 
     
Subnational Total Expenditure 0.0176*** (0.00335) 
 
0.0102*** (0.00341) 
Subnational Current Expenditure 0.0109*** (0.00180) 
 
0.00353* (0.00197) 
Subnational Capital Expenditure 0.00167 (0.00170) 
 
0.00173 (0.00179) 
Subnational Total Revenue 0.0275*** (0.00375) 
 
0.0230*** (0.00375) 
Subnational Tax Revenue 0.00682*** (0.00231) 
 
0.0156*** (0.00244) 
N 91,970   98,949  
Political decentralization 
     
Self-rule (ID+PS+FA+RP) -0.0165*** (0.00387) 
 
-0.000570 (0.00413) 
           Institutional depth (ID) -0.105*** (0.0162) 
 
-0.00445 (0.0180) 
           Policy Scope (PS) -0.0512*** (0.0164) 
 
0.0165 (0.0173) 
           Fiscal autonomy (FA) -0.0282* (0.0155) 
 
0.0477*** (0.0158) 
           Representation (RP) -0.0425*** (0.0105) 
 
-0.0316*** (0.0112) 
Shared-rule (EC+FC+CR) -0.0358*** (0.00698) 
 
-0.0150** (0.00764) 
           Executive control (EC) -0.0886*** (0.0200) 
 
-0.0586*** (0.0211) 
           Fiscal control (FC) -0.125*** (0.0272) 
 
-0.0473 (0.0307) 
           Constitutional reform (CR) -0.0941*** (0.0190) 
 
-0.0607*** (0.0213) 
N 105,637   113,818  
 
Significant at 
*** 
1 percent, 
** 
5 percent and 
*
 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
